Public Influence on US-Afghan Policy After 9/11
G. Almond's Structural Functionalist Approach

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Abstract

The war in Afghanistan had been examined and analyzed through multiple theoretical frameworks, most of which belong to the field of international relations. However, this paper provides an explanation from a functionalist theoretical prism and employs Gabriel Almond’s structural functionalist approach in the field of political science, which is focused on political system and policy elaboration process within the system. In this manner, theory attempts to bring clarification to US foreign policy decision-making process on war in Afghanistan while underlining the US public influence.

The paper aims to dissect Gabriel Almond’s theory through the political system and provide understanding how the integral components of the system interact with each other and how this interaction affects the results of foreign policy on US-Afghanistan example. According to the given research public mood had an important potential in affecting the US foreign policy decision-making process towards Afghanistan.

Keywords: Structural functionalism, input and output functions, cognition, perception, preference

Introduction

Gabriel Almond’s theoretical approach – structural functionalism remains as one of the most prominent theory in the political science, because of its analytical rigor, capability to cover different political systems and highlight both formal and informal aspect of policy decision-making. Therefore, employing this theory to explain US systemic decision-making in regard to War in Afghanistan represents novel approach to offer a qualitatively new understanding of that problem. Almond’s theory is another attempt to escape the temptation to study politics as one singular phenomenon and emphasizes that politics should be studied as a system of interactions, and political systems have to be analyzed as a set of structures performing functions. This approach does not harbor itself from any inherent flaws, although it provides a better understanding at a tactical level, which bears uttermost significance both for theorists and policy practitioners.

Afghanistan has almost always been one of the hottest spots of the world and it resulted in vast body of literature on multiple languages. Thus, analyzing major works on Gabriel Almond’s structural functionalism have been selected for the paper such as “The Politics of the Developing Areas” (1960), “A Developmental Approach to Political Systems” (1965), “Crisis, Choice and Change – Historical Studies of Political Development” (1973), “Comparative Politics – A Developmental Approach” (1966) and “The Civic Culture “ (Almond and Verba, 1963) present the basic shapes of Almond’s theory, which is focused on political system and policy elaboration process within the system, which is largely accomplished by interactions of different institutions. Additionally, Almond’s (1950) “The American People and Foreign Policy” is also included, for its sharp insight on impact of public mood upon the foreign policy decision-making.

The War in Afghanistan has always been a subject of mutual consensus between the dominant political parties, it is challenging to identify the signs of Groupthink. In fact, all the major foreign-policy stakeholders, be it newly elected presidents, influential departments of the government (for instance Department of State and Department of Defense), popular media outlets used to change their opinion and positions in regard to Afghan War and sought to influence the foreign-policy. (Janis, 1972) The biggest concern for the US and world political community, and public after 9/11 has indeed become the Global War on Terror, announced by the President George W. Bush. This is how many American voters looked at War in Afghanistan. (Singh, 2015).

The key components of the paper the analysis of public opinion/public mood and putting the figures in the analysis of US foreign policy making, underlining G. Almond’s structural functionalist approach. In this case, the best sources to consult were public opinion polls conducted by the most authoritative American polling companies, such as Gallup, Pew, Rasmussen as well as numerous other opinion polls conducted by American media outlets. Gabriel Almond believes that public mood has an important potential in affecting the foreign policy decision-making. At the same time, he also propounds the idea that average American is too preoccupied with other problems and do not give sufficient attention to foreign policy, thereby leaving the latter in the hands of political elites and other stakeholders with strongly articulated interests in foreign affairs. Additionally, to provide a strong analytical frame for these data, scholarly works were also studied. Out of them, the most important are Pillar’s (2011) “American Perceptions of Terrorism in the Post-9/11 Decade”, Huddy’s and Feldman’s (2011) “Americans Respond Politically to 9/11: Understanding the Impact of the Terrorist Attacks and Their Aftermath”, Bowman’s and Rugg’s (2011) “Attitudes Towards the War on Terror and the War in Afghanistan: A Ten Year Review”, Tomz’s et al (2017) “How and why does public opinion affect foreign policy in democracies?” and Berinsky’s (2009) “In time of War: Understanding American Public Opinion from World War II to Iraq.” The idea advocated by these authors is that public opinion on foreign policy issues is generally misinformed and lacks attention (same idea is supported by Almond), but when it reacts overwhelmingly it is able to steer or at least fundamentally affect the Washington’s foreign policy.

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Gabriel Almond’s Theory on Politics – Structural Functionalism

Gabriel Almond broadened the field of political science in the 1950s by incorporating approaches from other social science disciplines, such as sociology, psychology, and anthropology into his political science studies. His research subjects included the politics of nations that had become independent since World War II, Communism and how American public opinion affected foreign policy (Douglas M., 2003). It is believed that his role was instrumental in transformation of an interest in foreign policy into systematic studies of comparative political development and culture.

According to G. Almond, a political system is a system of action, empirically observable behavior of political system affected by the norms or institutions. Political institutions or persons performing political roles are viewed in terms of what it is that they do, why they do it and how what they do, is related to and affects what others do. The concept of system is composed of totality of relevant units, interdependence between the interactions of units (roles) and certain stability in the interaction of these units. At the same time, the concept of role can include formal offices, informal offices, families, electorates, mobs, casual as well as persistent groupings, and the like, is so far as they enter into and affect the political system and decision in foreign policy of both presidents (Pruthi, 2009).

While analyzing and comparing Bush’s and Obama’s administrations decisions towards involvement in Afghanistan, it’s interesting to answer the questions about what was American presidents’ action (strategy) and drawing the “picture” of the conflict, why presidents decided to deploy the troops in the country, and how their political decisions were affected by media, pressure groups, “public mood” and other relevant to subject entities. As praised by London (2009) “Almond’s brilliant innovation was to outline an approach to understanding political systems that took into account not only its structural components — its institutions — but also their functions within the system as a whole. Prior to structural functionalism, scholars had no way of systematically comparing different political systems beyond a rudimentary, and oftentimes inconclusive, analysis of their institutions.” (London S., 2009)

Another important ramification of Almond’s theory is a set of functional categories for the study of political systems. There are political (input) functions and governmental (output) functions. The political (input) functions are: (a) political socialization and recruitment, (b) interest articulation, (c) interest aggregation and (d) political communication. The governmental (output) functions are: (a) Rule-making, (b) rule application, and (c) rule adjudication (Miles, 2013). While another major concept of Almond is orientation to political action. The concepts of orientation to action and of the pattern variables are useful as they attempt logical distinctness and comprehensiveness. It consists of three components: 1. Perception, or cognition; 2. Preference, involvement, or affect (cathectic); 3. Evaluation of choice through the application of standards or values to the cognitive and affective components (Almond, 1956). Gabriel Almond defines cognition as the knowledge and discrimination of the objects, events, actions, issues, and the like, while by cathectic he refers to the investment of objects, issues, etc., with emotional significance, or affect and by evaluation assumes the manner in which individuals organize and select their perceptions, preferences, and values in the process of establishing political action (Almond, 1956). The institutional interest groups generally consist of legislatures, executives, bureaucracies etc. These institutional interest groups articulate interests (of their own) in various ways and they exert pressure upon the authority for the realization of interests. Out of which US public influence on US-Afghan policy is covered and analyzed in the given paper.

One more important facet of Almond’s interesting works of system in general and American political system in particular is the impact of public mood. In his “The American People and Foreign Policy” (1950), Almond writes that “the orientation of most Americans toward foreign policy is one of mood and mood is essentially an unstable phenomenon. […] American moods are affected by two variables: (1) changes in the domestic and foreign political-economic situation involving the presence or absence of threat in varying degrees, (2) the characterological predisposition of the population” (Almond, 1950. p.47). Further, Almond adds that “the average American is so deeply and tensely involved with immediate, private concerns that any diversion of attention meets with powerful resistance. When political issues impinge, or threaten to impinge, public attention broadens to include them. But the moment the pressure is reduced there is a swift withdrawal, like the snapping back of a strained elastic. […] the acceptance of the implications of America’s position in world affairs comes with great reluctance, and it may only be possible to motivate it in response to obvious and overt threat.” (Almond, 1950. p.81). In later works, Almond added that “there are many economic, ethnic and religious pressure groups and thus, there is more sustainability of function in the American system, more policy-making by pressure groups and the media of communication, more intervention in policy-making through the impact of “public moods”. (Almond, 1956, p.314)

Criticism of Gabriel Almond’s Theory

Gabriel Almond’s structural functionalism has been challenged across the spectrum of political science. One of the central parts of criticism of structural functionalism started was result of political upheaval in Europe in 1960s, when political scientists asserted that structural functionalism was unable to explain the rapid changes and focused more on elites and structures of powers as determinants of politics in general. Besides, G. Almond was openly criticized as “inventing” new words for his structural functionalist approach, which for them was merely play of words. In addition, scholars, such as Susser accused him in “translation of Anglo-American political norms in methodological terminology (1992, p. 270). Other, such as Levy claimed that notion of structures and interest aggregation was not clearly differentiated with not clearly marked boundaries (1971).

The criticism of Almond’s theory is found in the scientific articles of various scholars, such as Bhambhri (1973), Block (n.d.), Rothman (n.d.) and Groth (1970). They argue that as Almond decided to insert theoretical terms and concepts from sociology, those concepts could bear different connotation in political science, while of his arguments could be a subject of controversy and outright parsimonious. “Functionalism focuses too much upon sustainability of function in the American system, more policy-making by pressure groups and the media of communication, more intervention in policy-making through the impact of “public moods”. (Almond, 1956, p.314)

In fact, Almond and Powell have responded to that criticism, arguing that functional-systems theories imply an equilibrium or harmony of parts and that they have a static or conservative bias (Almond and Powell, 1966). Theorists of structural functionalism defined the task of political science research as “to ascertain how change in anyone of the parts of a political system affects other parts and the whole” (Almond and Powel, 1966, p.13).
Yet indeed, conducting research under Almond’s model, specifically, using its input and output conversion scheme may show well how the "two-level decisions" work in foreign policy. Almond claimed that certain political functions existed in all political systems. The conversion process of input and output level is very interesting to focus on. From that example, American people represented in interest groups are selected for input level, i.e. how did they support/accept or oppose political decisions regarding the specific policies in Afghanistan, and for the output level policies of both presidents’ administrations are compared. In the process, Almond’s categorization such as political “action”, “perception”, “cathexis”, are the measurements to further study the role of society, political parties or national interest while comparing both presidents’ policies and strategies towards Afghanistan.

G. Almond’s Concept on Public Perception and Its Influence of US-Afghan Policy

The War in Afghanistan has brought the political platforms of Republican and Democratic Parties closer to each other. The reasons behind that was Republican Party’s undisputed dominance in the wake of 9/11 terrorist attacks. In particular, the approval ratings for President Bush and his associates skyrocketed and gave them comfortable to advantage to have majority in the US congress. This was not left unnoticed by the Democratic Party, which relatively hardened its foreign policy rhetoric and put the War on Terror and protection of US as the main priorities of the political agenda. The convergence of Democratic and Republican Parties manifested foreign political strategies in regard to Afghanistan was particularly evident in the early years of the War in Afghanistan. The national-level politicians have regularly rallied behind the War in Afghanistan. They sensed the overwhelming national sentiment and sought to capitalize on that. This illustrated that American political parties, despite their edge in foreign policy making and lack of competition from other players, could oftentimes be followers of the public opinion.

One of the peculiarities of the American political system, which includes the political elites as well as media, is that it is very responsive to public opinion. Perhaps, the major reason behind that is the American way of thinking, which in many aspects stems from thorough economic calculation and reacts on incentives (Almond, 1950).

Before we analyze the influence of public perception/public mood over the Washington’s foreign policy course in regard to War in Afghanistan, the process of shaping the public attitude has to be understood properly. It is widely acknowledged that terrorist attacks in 2001 had a tremendous and very profound impact on American’s mindset and the policy preferences. As argued by Pillar (2011), “9/11 was one of the most traumatic events in US history. It powerfully shaped perception and emotions of the American public to a degree that few other events have. […] the thoughts of most Americans about terrorism and counterterrorism revolve almost entirely around 9/11” (Pillar, 2011, p.1).

The idea of fear, imminent terrorist attack and feeling that next big massacre was planned on America’s soil were dominant tenets of the US public immediately after the 9/11. By October 2001, almost half of Americans had a strong belief in inevitability of the next big terrorist attack and in total, 85% was confident that the next terrorist attack would be accomplished within next few months. (See the figure about the “American Respondents’ Belief in Imminent Terrorist Attack after 9/11 (%)” in the Appendix 1)

This bordering to panic fear at the end of 2001, is instructive to explain the overwhelming support of the American people to strong military response. As claimed by Singh (2014) for many, War in Afghanistan was perceived as a “defensive war” which was fought to preserve and protect the western/ American way of life and core values. This led some scholars (Huddy and Feldman, 2011) to assert that the psychological trauma pushed the American people to throw more support to a conservative, nationalist and militarist platforms and politicians. This perception that another and bigger terrorist attack was very likely, persisted for quite a long time (almost entire presidency of George Bush) and it was not until the mid-period of Obama’s first term (Mueller and Stewart, 2017), that it finally ceased to be in double digits after almost a decade of fluctuation.

It is assumed that the perception of the Americans in regard to threat associated with another terrorist attack on US soil has been the decisive factor to influence their level of support to various foreign or defense policy measures, be it sending ground troops, fighting and dismantling al-Qaeda or maintaining US military presence in Afghanistan. This is concluded by Huddy and Feldman (2011), who underline that “research on American political reactions […] suggests that support for a strong government response to terrorism is most likely when members of a population perceive a high risk of future terrorism and feel angry at terrorists” (Feldman, 2011, p.464). At the same time, the role of media in perpetuating this kind of thinking need not be underestimated, because as researched by Patrick and Meirick (2007). “whichever theme appears most frequently in the news media is also the most likely to be internalized by citizens.” (Patrick, Meirick, 2007, p.120)

In polling, preceding the 2004 presidential elections, conducted by CNN/USA Today throughout most part of the year, George Bush had maintained comfortable edge via-à-vis his Democratic rival, John Kerry on issues related to terrorism. (See the figure about ‘Comparison of Trust between Bush and Kerry before 2004 Elections” in the Appendix 2) Despite some gains that Democrats achieved in the final years of the Bush presidency, not surprisingly, the voters’ perceived preferences over the candidates of either Republican or the Democratic Party has been left unaltered during the 2008 Presidential Elections as well. In July 2008, when asked by CNN/ORC poll, 53% of those interviewed responded that the Republican Presidential candidate John McCain would better handle Afghanistan as compared to 43% who selected Barack Obama, his opponent from the Democratic Party. However, the latter was ahead of John McCain in almost every other aspect of the policy issues, including economy, which was of paramount importance for Americans.

While speaking about the influence of public opinion over the formulation of both domestic and foreign policies, Tomz, Weeks and Yarchi-Milo (2017), outline sanctioning and selection as the two major complementary mechanisms, through which public opinion affects the policy-making. Namely, the authors assume that “leaders fear that citizens will sanction them if they fail to heed public opinion [and] second, citizens select parties on the basis of their policy platforms” (Tomz, Weeks, Yarchi-Milo, 2017, p.26). This theory is applicable to both of the abovementioned cases – 1) George Bush was able to capitalize on public perception about imminent terror attack and Republican Party’s acknowledged superiority in foreign policy matters to easily defeat John Kerry in 2004, and 2) Despite not very solid foreign policy credentials Barack Obama managed to beat John McCain, because Obama’s perceived inexperience in foreign policy was fully compensated by commensurate strengths in domestic policy, economy, healthcare etc., while the Republican Party’s foreign and defense had almost totally lost support and credibility in population’s eyes (Smeltz et al, 2015).

This leads us to yet another pertinent to this research topic, which is waning support toward the War on Terror and War in Afghanistan. Indeed, considering the level of public support in early years of the War in Afghanistan it is puzzling, why the American public found itself more and more reluctant to continue support and funding to the longest war in the American history in the later years of Bush presidency and throughout the most
period of Barack Obama’s tenure as a president. This is particularly interesting in light of successful US counter-terrorism policy, which managed to prevent another large-scale terrorist attack and all things being equal would have boosted the public support toward the Washington’s war efforts. For almost half a century, big majority of the Americans have never favored the isolationist policy course and supported US active involvement in the world affairs. Further, large segment of the population is an ardent believer of the American exceptionalism and US unique role worldwide (Tyson, 2014). These sentiments have been particularly augmented after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The perception was that “the United States differs qualitatively from other developed nations, because of its unique origins, national credo, historical evolution and distinctive political and religious institutions” (Harold Hongju Koh quoted in Monten 2005, p.119). The idea of American exceptionalism has been equally heartily shared by both Bush and Obama administrations (Berinsky, 2009) and bipartisan support was something the American political elite could be proud of.

In fact, despite the positive attitude of the US role worldwide and belief that the promotion of democracy is a noble enterprise (Drezner, 2008), as of 2014, 73% of the US population opposed to see America in the role of a world policeman (Rasmussen Reports, 2014). In addition, 53% of the interviewed is against the US nation-building efforts and almost half of them think that nation building in Afghanistan was failure (Rasmussen Reports, 2016). Of particular importance is that American people has almost never believed that War in Iraq was an integral part of War on Terror. On similar thought, Nacos, Bloch-Eikon and Shapiro (2007) argue “after the invasion of Iraq, more Americans believed that the war had increased the threat of terrorism against the United States than that it had decreased” (Nacos, Bloch-Eikon, Shapiro, 2007, p.116). Bennet concurs with that assessment, noting that “from a public perspective, people in the US have grown very tired of both interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan as those turned into long term actions with little visible result”. (Bennet R., 2017). Kendziera also supports this idea, claiming that “the amount of time, resources and human life expended there caused the population to grow weary. Reports of a corrupt and ineffective Afghan government and reports of poor performance by the Afghan soldiers and police. “Insider” killings of coalition soldiers by Afghan forces only intensified the frustration”. Kendziera, C., 2018.

Therefore, one of the principal reasons for the shift in public attitude toward the War in Afghanistan can be identified as the unwillingness of US population to get involved in costly, bloody and largely failed process of nation building (at some point in 2012, people who thought that War in Afghanistan was a mistake exceeded those who believed the war was justified), especially on false premises (this mostly concerns the War in Iraq and allegation that Saddam Hussein possessed the WMD. However, by association through War on Terror, War in Afghanistan had to take the similar criticism). Miller (2010) assumes that “the Afghan war lost popularity as it transformed from a […] defensive mission to extripate al-Qaeda’s bases, to a more complex counterinsurgency and nation-building exercise (Miller, 2010, p.5). After the first few years with strong and sustained support, since 2009, backing has moved downhill. With occasional upswings, such as Obama’s decision to start surge in Afghanistan and killing Osama Bin Laden the decline has been irreversible until the emergence of ISIS, whose brutality and swiftness contributed to catapult the supporters’ figures back to over 50%.

However, there is at least one more reason that nourished the feeling of disillusionment of the American people in regard to US conduct and success in War in Afghanistan. This was the prospect of actually winning the war against terrorism. The research made by the Council of Foreign Relations (2009) indicate that “in assessing the struggle between the United States and al-Qaeda, the predominant public view in the United States has been that neither side is winning” (p.3). (See the table concerning the “Historic Trend: Who is Winning War on Terror?” in the Appendix 3)

While the complicated nature of War on Terror might not be easy to explain in numbers and associated difficulties in measurement of success can be faulty, it is assessed with reasonable confidence that American public’s confidence in actually winning the War on Terror has been on a decline since 2005. The sharp downturn in 2015 could be explained by the empowering of terrorist networks in the Middle East (it was later reversed after the fight against ISIS and other radical groups forced the so-called Caliphate to retreat), but that does change a general picture that Americans no longer wanted to fight the unwinnable war (although many of them supported responsible and not abrupt withdrawal).

Perhaps one of the most tangible explanations, why the support for the War in Afghanistan has been lessened so much, could be found in safeguarding the United States from becoming a victim of another large-scale terrorist attack. In the period of 2006-2010, when the shift of public opinion in regard to War in Afghanistan was reversed from positive to more of a negative, has been a period, when Americans got convinced that likelihood of another 9/11 was not that great. It also confirms Pillar’s assumption that “public concern about terrorism and support for efforts to counter it tends to spike upward immediately after terrorist attacks and subside gradually downward as time passes without another attack” (Pillar, 2011, p.2). (Check the figure referring the “Number of Americans on Odds of Another Terrorist Attack” in the Appendix 4)

Finally, it is worthy to mention that novel features of modern warfare have also affected the American mindset in regard to military engagement. Namely, as highlighted by Smetlz et al (2015), “Americans have grown more supportive of lower-risk tactics, such as air strikes and assassinations and less supportive of high risk tactics, – namely the use of ground troops […] a shift from previous patterns” (Smetlz et al, 2015, p.2). The drone program, among others, has proved to be especially effective in War in Afghanistan. In the words of McKelvey (2013), “the drone program represents a shift in a strategy for the United States, turning the nation away from large-scale deployment of troops and instead focusing on drones and small bands of special operators who carry out lethal operations” (McKelvey, 2013, p.2). This program and the policy of heavy air strikes against the enemy compounds would become the centerpiece of Barack Obama’s strategy. (See the table concerning the “Effectiveness of Actions of Combat Terrorism (2011)” in the Appendix 5)

Overall, the research identifies several key components in determining the co-relation between the public attitude and policy decisions. It is clear that the public attitude was most profoundly impacted by the 9/11 as well as by fear of another terrorist attack and destruction on massive scale, threatening the American way of life itself. In turn, both media and political elites responded to those overwhelming public sentiments by rallying behind the flag when it came to War in Afghanistan, adjusting their editorial policy (blatantly pro-American, pro-military) and policy platforms (elevating fight to terrorism and overseas military engagements) to a prominent place.

Conclusion

The research demonstrated that apart from high costs associated with foreign military operations, the gradual shift in public attitude was caused by association of War in Afghanistan to War in Iraq, altering the threat perception of American population in regard to imminent terrorist attack, redefinition of US mission from narrowly limited “defeating al-Qaeda and killing Osama” to broader nation-building and absence of large-scale terrorist attack on US soil, which pushed the American population to become more concerned with the state of the economy instead of crippled al-Qaeda.
Most importantly, analysis demonstrated the way and methods, which in accordance with Almond’s theoretical framework, constitute the structure of the decision-making process in the field of foreign policy in general and regarding the War in Afghanistan in particular. In other words, this analysis demonstrated the input-output model in practice, emphasizing the conversion of civic demands into decisions and policies.

In particular, this research studied and analyzed the interaction and corresponding influence between US media, political parties and public opinion. Gabriel Almond’s model on interest articulation, political communication and interest aggregation has been theoretically enacted with the participation of respective structures of political system. The model of conversion has involved all the basic tenets of Almond’s structural functionalism, although the process itself has not been straightforward and unimpeded. Instead, the process has been shaped by interaction of structures and convergence of their functions. Therefore, while it is scientifically unjustified to make case for strong causation, correlation between public opinion, media coverage and political parties’ platforms has been duly evident particularly in 2001-2009 and to some extent this trend was kept in place in the following years as well.

In light of US population’s obsession with the media, the latter is one of most influential factor, affecting myriad foreign and domestic policies. The overwhelming presence enables media to shape and mold public opinion and set a political agenda. This was the case for US media after the 9/11 attacks, when the US public opinion became completely dominated by the fear of next terrorist attacks. In turn, this swelled the demand on terrorism-related topics where the voters would be assured that they were well-protected and US was fighting a “good war.” Furthermore, the magnitude and psychological effect of the terrorist attacks, effectively pushed the media to be on the US government’s side, covering the War in Afghanistan as a positive and necessary undertaking and making emphasis on initial low costs and casualties associated with the war. These attitudes of the media towards the War in Afghanistan were more or less kept throughout George W. Bush and Barack Obama presidencies. However, the shift in the American public opinion, which became weary of the lengthy war, was reflected upon the media too. They started to respond the public mood—maintained generally supportive tone for the war but offered criticism for its conduct, levels of involvement and ambiguity of the mission. It is clear that the terrorist attacks on 9/11 have had a lasting and profound impact upon the American public opinion. The authoritative surveys demonstrated that for many years, Americans were obsessed with the possibility of another terrorist attacks and therefore demonstrated complete support to Washington’s efforts, be it air campaigns, clandestine operations or ground invasion, which was properly used by the both presidents to justify their policies.

Theoretical reflection of Gabriel Almond’s structural functionalism concludes that by acknowledgment of vastly important roles that structures play within the political system. Interaction and relation between the political parties, media and public opinion have helped them to fulfill their function of interest articulation, political communication and interest aggregation. This in turn contributed to input-put conversion process, when public demand and needs, shaped and influenced by external factors and media have been absorbed, processed, channeled, and affected by the political parties and ultimately enacted by the Presidents of the country. That approves the validity of the theory to analyze the political processes from the systematic studies.

Appendix:

**Appendix 1. American Respondents’ Belief in Imminent Terrorist Attack after 9/11 (%)**

| Source: Bowman, K., Rugg, A. (2011) |
Appendix 2. Comparison of Trust between Bush and Kerry before 2004 Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>UNITED STATES/ALLIES</th>
<th>TERRORISTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mar 5-7, 2004</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 7-9, 2004</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2004</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 10-18, 2004</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 27-31, 2004</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 3-10, 2004</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept 6-12, 2004</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct 15-21, 2004</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 22-28, 2004</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Bowman, K., Rugg, A., (2011)

Appendix 3. Historic Trend: Who is Winning War on Terror?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>UNITED STATES/ALLIES</th>
<th>TERRORISTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Appendix 4. Number of Americans On Odds of Another Terrorist Attack

Appendix 5. Effectiveness of Actions of Combat Terrorism (2011)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Methods</th>
<th>Very Effective/Somewhat Effective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increase of U.S. airstrikes against Islamic State to take out leaders, heavy weapons, infrastructure</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overhaul federal visa waiver program to provide tighter screening for those who enter U.S. temporarily</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ban gun sales to people on the federal no-fly watch list</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Send more U.S. special operations forces to fight the Islamic State or ISIS</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Bowman, K., Rugg, A. (2011)

References:


