Russia-Ukraine War: 
US Policy and Its Implications on Global World Order

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Abstract

The Russia–Ukraine war and its future consequences is unclear, but how the process develops will clearly affect Russia's future course, and how the war ends will have its fundamental implications for global order. Since the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the United States has taken the lead in providing Ukraine with substantial military equipment and training, economic aid as well as diplomatic support. The paper focuses on the US strategic interests in Russia-Ukraine War, its role and implications on the world order. It analyses the regional affects and the US interests as a democratic state in the global order. Finally, the paper focuses on US sanctions against Russia, underlines its influence over the regional security and democracy, and concentrates on the aids as well as funds provided by US to Ukraine.

Keywords: USA, Strategy, Ukraine, Sanctions, World Order.

Introduction

Ukraine has long played an important, role in the global security order. Today, the country is on the front lines of a renewed great-power rivalry. As noted by Jonathan Master’s, Ukraine was a cornerstone of the Soviet Union. Behind only Russia, it was the second-most-populous and powerful of the fifteen Soviet republics, home for much of the union’s agricultural production, defense industries, and military, including the Black Sea Fleet and some of the nuclear arsenal. In its three decades of independence, Ukraine sought to strengthen its own path as a sovereign state while looking for more close ties with Western institutions, including the European Union and NATO. (Masters, 2023)

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Russia-Ukraine war has an important role in socio-political world affairs too. Ukraine’s Westward shift since independence has been challenged by Russia, most recently with Russia’s invasion in February 2022, escalating both countries’ eight-year-old conflict which increased the danger for global security. It is unclear how the Russia–Ukraine war will unfold in the east or the south, or how recent Ukrainian successes will affect Russia’s future course. However, the war eventually ends, it will have fundamental implications for global order. It is important, therefore, to imagine how it might end, with special attention paid to the potential for strategic surprises. (Masters, 2023)

It’s unclear how the war ends, despite the heavy fighting in and around the eastern city of Bakhmut and other parts of the Donbas, the frontlines have not substantively changed in months. Russia’s offensive policy appears to be underway, but Moscow lacks the capabilities to make any significant gains while the US support together with its Western allies was significant for Ukraine. The statement of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken emphasizes the US role in the given war: “If Russia stops fighting, the war ends. If Ukraine stops fighting, Ukraine ends.” The reason that Zelensky and his country keep fighting is clear: if they do not, Ukraine as it is will cease to exist. (Andrea Kendall-Taylor, 2023)

The U.S. interest in preventing the emergence of a Eurasian regional hegemon and in building what then-President Bill Clinton termed a Europe “whole, free, and at peace” might require thwarting Russia by deepening support for Ukraine. (Shifrinson, 2022)

It is obvious that the world has become deeply and politically engaged in the Russia-Ukraine war due to its longstanding period. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the United States has taken the lead in providing Ukraine with military equipment, training, economic aid, diplomatic support. The West, especially the U.S. imposed sanctions against Russia while providing aid to Ukraine from the war’s onset. Russia, for its part, insisted that its military action is a “special military operation” and that the West is engaged in a de facto “proxy war” with Russia. (Shifrinson, 2022)

According to J. Shifrinson (2022) the danger of future aggression is from Russia specifically - that is, if Russia goes unchallenged in Ukraine, then Moscow will simply expand its ambitions, challenge the United States’ North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies, and ultimately threaten European security. If the United States as well as its Western allies does not take action to support Ukraine, it will call into question the American commitment to democracy and undermine democracy worldwide. As Shifrinson (2022) argues, Russian aggression challenges the principle
of state sovereignty, which is a cornerstone of the liberal world order. Ignoring Russian aggression would undermine the U.S.-backed postwar order, end the American presence in Europe, and weaken NATO. Inaction would harm the international order and make it more difficult to uphold democratic values. (Shifrinson, 2022)

It is important to underline that Ukraine has a vital strategic location and involves a Russian strategic challenge that affects all of Europe and the U.S. transatlantic partnership with both NATO and the European Union. According to Cordesman (2023) the outcome of the war in Ukraine will affect U.S. strategic interests; it is also a clear example that for all the talk of an integrated strategy and a rules-based order, the United States at present only has a limited integrated strategy in dealing with Europe. Anything that approaches a rules-based order is limited to some developed countries. (Cordesman, 2023)

European states also face even more challenges in dealing with the costs of the war than the United States, and at least as much popular and domestic political resistance to aiding Ukraine and rebuilding the real-world security structure of NATO. Other strategic partners in Asia, the MENA region, and the rest of the world will see Ukraine as a test of U.S. capability beyond military terms. They will see the war as a test of U.S. capability to compete at a diplomatic and economic level. At least some will also see the war as a test of just how much the United States is focusing on China to the point where its commitments outside Taiwan and dealing with China have far less importance. (Cordesman, 2023)

**Russia’s War in Ukraine and Its Implications**

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, initiated on February 24, 2022, is the most significant shocks to the current global order. Its impact is of course most directly felt by Ukrainians, who have suffered enormous devastation and are still, as of this writing, fighting for their national independence. As Brink and Hakimi (2022) underline, “by invading Ukraine, Russia made plain that it rejects the foundational principle of the post-World War II order”, namely that international boundaries may not be changed with force alone. The invasion is not just another in a long string of violations of Article 2(4). It threatens the stability of borders around the world, borders on which the current world order is premised”. (Ingrid Brunk, 2022)

In the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, NATO states have solidified their security commitments to one another and, in June, invited Finland and Sweden to join their ranks. The United States has also reinforced its security alliances with other countries, especially in Asia. Thus, the
future depends much more on what these other states do—on whether they are involved in the core principle that has for decades defined the world order and are willing to do what is necessary to fight for the cause, even when their own country is not in the direct line of fire. (Ingrid Brunk, 2022)

The global response to the invasion of Ukraine has shown some promise. According to Brunk (2022) “in the July 2022 Contemporary Practice of the United States section of AJIL, Kristen Eichensehr reviews the extensive practice of states, international courts, and other international institutions in condemning Russia’s conduct in Ukraine. In the UN Security Council, most states denounced Russia’s invasion as a blatant violation of the UN Charter.” Within days of the invasion, Ukraine initiated proceedings before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), claiming that Russia misapplied the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. And, on March 16, the ICJ issued an order determining that “it is doubtful that the [Genocide] Convention . . . authorizes a Contracting Party’s unilateral use of force in the territory of another State for the purpose of preventing or punishing an alleged genocide,” and directing Russia to “immediately suspend the military operations that it commenced on 24 February 2022 in the territory of Ukraine.” The European Court of Human Rights separately also ordered interim measures in a case that Ukraine filed before it, directing Russia “to refrain from military attacks against civilian and civilian objects . . . within the territory under attack or siege by Russian troops”. (Ingrid Brunk, 2022)

Effects of International Sanctions

It’s important to consider the sanctions having been implemented by the US and its Western allies as it has an important effect how the war continues and the world order is perceived. After the outbreak of the war, US together wish many Western countries joined in various sanctions against Russia and have continued to deliver economic and military aid needed for the war to Ukraine. Such support has contributed to Ukraine’s ability to both thwart Russia’s early operational plans and to strike back to undermine Russia’s war operations. (Kyunghan Lim, 2022) Besides, Belarus, the United States, the European Union, the G7, and a number of other Western and non-Western partners imposed sanctions on Russia to increase the economic costs of the war by putting pressure on the real economy.

Energy security became a top-priority around the world. As Lim (2022) states, Russia responded sanctions of West by cutting off natural gas deliveries to Europe. As a result, the European Union’s natural gas imports from Russia have plummeted; the Nord Stream pipelines had been the largest route for Russian energy supplies to Germany until 2021, but it saw a sharp fall in transport since June and was completely closed in September. Furthermore, global energy prices of 2022 soared up to 100% from a year earlier. The E.U. is itself going further in moving away from the Russian energy
supply chain. As of December 2022, the G7 countries and the E.U. were pushing for a price cap on purchases of Russian crude oil, while Russia declared it would not export energy to countries that join such sanctions. (Kyunghan Lim, 2022) Furthermore, Korea, Japan, and Australia, all allies of the U.S., have aligned themselves with the West by supporting and providing aid to Ukraine. China, for its part, did not participate in the war actively, staying politically neutral and cooperating with Russia economically. The Russia-Ukraine war will accelerate the strengthening of political and economic blocs in the region. (Kyunghan Lim, 2022)

As mentioned above, sanctions were imposed in diverse sectors, consequently considering its effects is crucial to further analyze the US as well as its Western Allies strategies in condemning the aggressive behavior of a state in the given multipolar world order. In October 2022, the EU had issued sanctions against Russia; specifically in the financial sector, the main sanctions consisted the ban on transactions involving the administration of reserves of the Central Bank of Russia, which indicates the inability to convert assets held in US dollars and euros into rubles, hence a freeze of a large part of the Bank’s foreign-exchange reserves. Furthermore, major Russian banks have been excluded from the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) system, all transactions with certain state-owned enterprises have been banned, issuance of transferable securities and money-market instruments has been restricted, and new investments in the Russian energy sector have been prohibited. (OECD, 2023)

As for energy sector, according to the report of OECD (2023) various western countries are limiting, to different degrees, their imports of oil and gas, as well as exports of goods and technology suited for use in oil refining. In early June 2022, the EU adopted sanctions, introducing an embargo on imports of all Russian seaborne crude oil and petroleum products (90% of the EU’s current oil imports from Russia). A temporary exemption was granted to EU Member States with a particular pipeline dependency on Russia (e.g., Hungary, Czech Republic), as well as Bulgaria (due to its specific geographical exposure) and Croatia (which needs vacuum gas oil for its refinery). However, Member States benefiting from these exemptions will not be able to resell such crude oil and petroleum products to other Member States or third countries. (OECD, 2023)

Sanctions in trade sector is also shown; export to Russia of high-tech products, luxury goods, and dual-use goods, including chemicals and lasers, has been banned. Further export bans involve goods and technology suited for the aviation and space industries, as well as those that could contribute to Russia’s military, defense and security sector. On the other hand, restrictions on imports have also been imposed. Commodities affected by the bans include imports of iron, steel, coal, timber, cement, and liquor to the EU. Other sanctions as OECD (2023) underlies included the airspace ban on aircrafts operated by Russian air carriers, a prohibition to Russian warships from entering EU
ports and Russian and Belarusian automobiles from driving on EU roads, and the suspension of the broadcasting activities in the EU of the Russian state-owned outlets Sputnik and Russia Today. (OECD, 2023)

Concerning the United States, the former National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley states that the United States has an abiding concern in deterring Russian President “from thinking he can in the next five or ten years repeat this performance…”. This particular concern helps explain why at least some in the Biden administration call for “weaken[ing] Russia” by bleeding it in Ukraine. J. Shifrinson underlines that the President Biden advanced this claim, writing in March that “If Russia does not pay a heavy price for its actions, it will send a message to other would-be aggressors that they too can seize territory and subjugate other countries”. (Shifrinson, 2022)

The United States joined sanctions on Russia’s largest financial institutions, banks, state-owned enterprises, elites, and family members, as well as by prohibiting new investments in the country. Overall, as OECD (2023) describes the US sanctions include prohibiting the import of Russian oil, natural gas, and coal, sanctions on more than 200 individuals and entities, and various restrictions on Russian financial institutions, as well as a prohibition on the export of US dollar banknotes and many US technologies to Russia. The US also increased import taxes on goods from Russia to erase World Trade Organization (WTO) membership advantages and suspended the “Normal Trade Relations with Russia and Belarus” act, effectively raising considerably US tariffs against both countries. (OECD, 2023)

Russia’s Response to Sanctions

Russia responded sanctions by imposing economic measures, such as capital controls in stabilizing the ruble. According to OECD (2023) the Russian Central Bank imposed severe restrictions on foreign exchange markets and capital movements in an attempt to prevent the depreciation of the ruble; for instance, the limitation of the amount that Russian citizens can withdraw in dollars and euros to USD 10 000 (increased on 16 May to USD 50 000) per calendar month. (OECD, 2023) Furthermore, all Russian exporters were initially required to convert at least 80% of their foreign currency revenue into rubles, a threshold lowered to 50% on 23 May. Other actions were allowing Russian debtors to pay off debts exceeding 10 million rubles to non-Russian creditors based in “unfriendly” states only in Russian rubles, prohibiting companies from “unfriendly countries” from buying non-ruble currency in Russia and demanding all international payments for gas in rubles. The efforts to strengthen the ruble have subsequently been tempered by the Russian Central Bank’s moves to cut interest rates, from a high of 20% in March to 7.5% on 16 September. (OECD, 2023) At the same time, Russia has banned exports of certain goods, as on 8 March, Russia issued a de-
cree listing over 200 items that could no longer be exported from Russia (except to EAEU member countries) including pharmaceutical products, agricultural machinery, manufacturing equipment, machine tools and hand tools, electrical devices, vehicles and their components. And finally, Russia limited access to Western media channels and social media networks. (OECD, 2023)

**Attempts of Kremlin to cooperate with China**

It’s also noteworthy to mention that in February 2022, days before Russia invaded Ukraine, China and Russia adopted joint statement that amounts a comprehensive estimate with the Western approach to the world order. As Lehne (2023) mentions, the statement condemns “some actors representing but a minority on the international scales” for advocating for unilateral approaches, resorting to force, interfering in the internal affairs of others, and generally hampering the development and progress of mankind. The document notes an ongoing transformation of the world order and a trend toward a redistribution of power. They emphasize the centrality of the United Nations, the principles of the UN Charter, and international law in general. They pledge to “advance multipolarity and promote the democratization of the international system”. (Lehne, 2023)

China and Russia have engaged in some international institution building. This includes the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Eurasian Economic Union, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and the New Development Bank (formerly known as the BRICS Development Bank). Despite, these initiatives have limited scope as both Beijing’s and Moscow’s priorities are to strengthen their own positions within the existing multilateral system. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and China’s threatening behavior toward Taiwan and in the South China Sea challenge fundamental principles of that very order. (Lehne, 2023)

Challenging issue is China. It is obvious that due to the intensity of the U.S.-led response to Russia’s invasion, Russia has increasingly turned to China for economic aid, diplomatic support, and military assistance. This situation has rebounded to China’s advantage, with Beijing able to set favorable terms of trade with Moscow, increase market access for China’s own goods and services, and gain political leverage, the result complicates U.S. strategy in geopolitical reach, limiting another hegemon in the region. (Shifrinson, 2022) (Please see the details in the Appendix 1. Sanctions - The U.S., Europe, and other nations imposed broad and severe sanctions on Russia)

**US Role in Russia-Ukraine War**

Analyzing the current as well as future consequences of the Russia-Ukraine war in the global world order is important. As J. Shifrinson (2022) defines the United States has an abiding interest in Ukraine because it affects the so-called “liberal international order.” And, as President Biden ex
plained, Ukraine was part of an ongoing “battle between democracy and autocracy, between liberty and repression”. (Shifrinson, 2022) Failing to act would call into question the American support for democracies as well as undermining the democracy worldwide.

As Shifrinson (2022) asserts Russian aggression challenges state sovereignty principles that are not to be tolerated in the liberal world order; and ignoring Russian aggression would undermine the U.S.-backed postwar “order” and would end the American presence in Europe, the European Union, and undermining NATO view of the world. Inaction risks would harm the international order. J. Shifrinson underlines well realist analysis on ideas on an anarchic world, where self-interested states have to ensure their own security and check potential aggressors. The distribution of power in Europe underlines that there are multiple states that, singly or collectively, are more than capable of influencing Russian calculations. In addition, modern warfare appears relatively more favorable to defensive military operations than offensive operations—evidenced today by the comparative success under-resourced and less numerous Ukrainian units have had in blunting Russian offensives in the recent contest, using defense-favoring weapons such as anti-tank guided missiles. This reinforces the feasibility of balancing by allowing a range of states to conclude that resistance to aggression can pay. (Shifrinson J., 2022) (Please see the Appendix 2. The Balance of Power Between Russia and NATO-Europe) It’s clear that possible aggression against NATO members is concerned. Distinct from efforts to aid Ukraine itself, the alliance has responded to Russian aggression by drawing together to a degree unmatched in the last twenty years; both declared policy and emerging military trends indicate that its members are increasingly committed to defending what Biden termed “every inch of NATO territory.” (Ashley Parker, 2022) And, it is also evident that Russia risks the counterbalancing coalition should it attempt to move against NATO members. Combined, there are thus strong reasons that Russia’s aggression in Europe will pay. Furthermore, Shifrinson emphasizes well that state calculations are shaped not by general impressions of how a single great power may respond but contextual judgments of whether counterbalancing and punishment are likely given the distribution of power and known state interests. (Shifrinson, 2022)

According to Shifrinson (2022), the United States can afford to ignore Ukraine without risking aggression (and not only the aggression), but it has the interest to act together with other states multilaterally. At the same time, the United States is free not to follow further involvement in Ukraine and can take simple steps to reinforce its ability to thwart aggression irrespective of what happens in Ukraine, it can penalize Russia aggression to signal its commitment by, for example, encouraging a NATO build-up in Eastern Europe and maintaining targeted sanctions on Moscow, but US role in establishing the liberal world order is crucial. According to Shifrinson the outcome in Ukraine is the key factor determining whether other states will choose war overlook the real geopolitical
conditions that are likely to shape other states’ interest. (Shifrinson, 2022)

Failing to act in Ukraine will cause other states that aggression pays. Aggression anywhere is a direct threat to vital U.S. interests. “Aggression remains a reality in international politics as, even when one aggressor is defeated, others do not readily seem to “learn” the lesson”. (Walt, 2022)

**Foreign Aid to Ukraine from US and Its Western Allies**

It’s important to consider the foreign aid and its consequences over Russia-Ukraine War. According to Kiel Institute for the World Economy, from the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine war, US led and the Europe followed the assistance for the Ukraine. Military support increased during the twelve months from January 2022 to January 2023. (Jonathan Masters, 2023)

According to Masters J. (2023) over 2022, the US led the way with major support decisions for Ukraine, with EU countries following with some delay and overtaking the US in the meantime with their total commitments. With additional data collected from November 21, 2022 to January 15 2023, the US again takes the lead. With additional pledges of nearly 37 billion euros in December, the Americans have earmarked a total of just over 73.1 billion euros for Ukraine support. For the EU, the comparable figure is 54.9 billion euros. Overall, pledges of humanitarian assistance remained relatively constant over the course of the year, while the share of financial and military support pledges grew. As of January 2023 data, 42 countries have provided military aid to Ukraine, but US role stands out. (Jonathan Masters, 2023)

In 2022, U.S. foreign assistance included various priorities of the Biden administration, such as combating climate change, responding to the COVID-19 pandemic, and countering authoritarianism. Since Russia’s invasion in February of that year, Ukraine has become the top recipient of U.S. foreign aid. According to the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Biden administration and U.S. Congress have directed approximately $73.18 billion in assistance to Ukraine including the humanitarian, financial, and military support: (Jonathan Masters, 2023)

**US Aid Commitments from January 24, 2022 to January 15, 2023 included (KIEL Institute for the World Economy, 2023):**

- Military Aid – 44.34 billion €
- Humanitarian Aid – 3.72 billion €
- Financial Aid – 25.11 billion €
- Total aid by the Unites States: 73.18 billion €

It’s noteworthy to mention that much of the aid to Ukraine has gone toward providing weapons systems, training, and intelligence to defend against Russia, and the military aid provided by the Unit
ed States and other allies has played a major role in Ukraine’s defense and counteroffensive policy against Russia. (Jonathan Masters, 2023) The United States has run real risks with Russia challenging military relations with the country as well as real costs, the budgets of the U.S. (Please see the details in the Appendix 3. US Military Aid to Ukraine Since the Invasion; Appendix 4. US Aid to Ukraine Exceeding that From Other Countries; and the Appendix 5. Total Government Aid to Ukraine)

As Wolfgang states the military front, commitment of additional U.S. forces in Europe calling for additional ground forces, strike aircraft, naval vessels, and support elements will bring U.S. force totals including 100,000 personnel. Reinforcing Europe draws largely on land forces. (Wolfgang, 2022)

The US Strategic Interests in Ukraine

It is important to analyze the US National Security Strategy of Biden-Harris Administration underlining the US role in global affairs promoting free and secure world, strengthening alliances, as well as constraining imperialist foreign policy. As it is mentioned in the strategy Russia’s destabilizing actions are not limited to the international arena: “Over the past decade, the Russian government has chosen to pursue an imperialist foreign policy with the goal of overturning key elements of the international order. This culminated in a full-scale invasion of Ukraine…”. (White House Washington, 2022)

In introducing the U.S. National Security Strategy, adopted in October 2022, U.S. President Joe Biden also speaks of a “significant inflection point in world history,” but the document is less pessimistic. It not only highlights similar concerns about the heating up of geopolitical competition, but it also expresses confidence in the enduring strength of the United States as the world’s most powerful nation. Although the National Security Strategy sharply condemns Russian aggression, it unsurprisingly focuses more on China, calling the country the United States’ “only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, military, and technological power to advance that objective.” (White House Washington, 2022)

America claims that economic sanctions would reduce Russia’s economic output by half, Russia’s GDP shrank by only 4 percent in 2022. Russia’s exports to China rose to $190 billion in 2022 from $86 billion in 2021, and exports to India reportedly doubled to $27 billion in 2022 from $13 billion in 2021, although the true total probably is higher. Russian fertilizer revenues rose by 70% in 2022 vs. 2021 despite a 10% drop in volume. Chinese and Indian goods have replaced many Western items, with only minor inconvenience to Russian consumers. (Cordesman, 2023)

It’s important to mention that the United States should keep its course on Ukraine because it is essential to America’s national security interests and democratic values, as the defeat of Ukraine...
defeat would create the world more dangerous and unstable. In State of the Union address, President Joe Biden stated that backing Ukraine matters “because it keeps the peace and prevents open season for would-be aggressors to threaten our security and prosperity.” (Johan Hassel, 2023) As President Volodymyr Zelenskyy stated in his historic address to a joint meeting of Congress, U.S. support for Ukraine “is not charity, it’s investment in global security and democracy.” Referring to the war’s implications for China, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg stated, “Beijing is watching closely and learning lessons that may influence its future decisions. So, what happens in Europe today could happen in Asia tomorrow.” Hence, deterring the Russia-Ukraine war has critical implications for peace and stability around the world for democracies, universal principles of self-determination and human rights too. (Johan Hassel, 2023)

U.S. Strategy and the Civil Dimension of Warfare

The United States together with its partners supported Ukraine. In both the Trump and Biden administrations’ national and defense strategies, the Ukraine war demonstrates that Russia remains a threat that is as real as China, clearly emphasized in US Security Strategy 2022. (Cordesman, 2023)

As bodies like the UNDP and World Bank have made clear, there is no present way to estimate the ultimate cost of recovery or how to deal with loss of territory or its agricultural and industrial export capabilities, however, the UNDP stated that Ukraine must deal with millions of displaced citizens and issued a preliminary briefing on the possible total cost of rebuilding the civil structure of Ukraine that first appeared in October 2022 that reached $600-750 billion euros. (Olivier Knox, 2023)

As Cordersman (2023) notes, the longer-term aid is needed to support civil aid for both war fighting and recovery. For the same reason, UNDP, the World Bank, European Union, United States should create a recovery and development plan for Ukraine. To make sure that the implementation of immediate humanitarian and other civil aid is linked to overall nationwide efforts to ensure that the civil structure of Ukraine can sustain the fighting and meet Ukraine’s economic and social priorities. While giving Ukraine the necessary long-term mix of civil support and aid requires at least as much planning and outside commitment as does military aid. (Cordesman, 2023)

J. Hassel (2023) emphasizes very important considerations of the recent condition of the war in Ukraine and its support. Thus, analyzing the current situation and to think about the preferable long-term strategies as well as international support is crucial for the country. As Hassel (2023) suggests, the major sectors include politics, economy, energy, infrastructure, agriculture, humanitarian support, etc. As it follows:

Political and Economic Resilience - Stabilizing and rebuilding Ukraine’s economy as well as its
governmental capacity will be important in the nearest future to support Ukraine’s to win the war, and provide the long term political and economic resilience. In 2022, Congress appropriated $13 billion to help Ukraine in its economic, social and political pressures of the war and maintain the main government services like hospitals, schools, and utilities running. These funds are also designated to strengthen human security and access to nutritious food, safe water, health care, shelter, and other urgent support. And finally, addressing Ukraine’s challenges with institution-building and corruption will be essential to long-term success. (Johan Hassel, 2023)

Energy and Infrastructure - The war in Ukraine has caused significant damage to Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. Ukraine’s energy infrastructure is essential for the country’s economy, safety and its people’s well-being. Thus, rebuilding Ukraine’s energy infrastructure will help to strengthen the country’s resilience and its ability to withstand future attacks. Russia is deliberately targeting Ukraine’s energy infrastructure to break the will of the Ukrainian people and undermine the government’s ability to provide essential services. Hence, the United States and its allies have provided material and technical support to help Ukraine repair its damaged energy infrastructure. The United States should continue to provide this support and help Ukraine rebuild its energy infrastructure and green economy in a way that is sustainable and resilient. (Johan Hassel, 2023)

Agriculture - The war in Ukraine has had a devastating impact on the country’s agricultural sector. Damage to farmlands, farming communities, and the breakdown of supply chains have led to a sharp decline in agricultural production, and this has had a ripple effect on the global food market, driving up food prices and pushing millions of people into food insecurity. Biden administration released $9 billion in aid to those most vulnerable to food insecurity. Such actions are essential to mitigate the impact of the war on global food security and to help Ukraine rebuild its agricultural sector. Ukraine is a major exporter of wheat, corn, and sunflower oil. The war has disrupted the global trade in these commodities, leading to shortages and price increases. The war has also had a negative impact on food security in countries that rely on Ukraine for imports. The Biden administration’s actions are a significant step towards addressing the global food crisis, but more needs to be done. (Johan Hassel, 2023)

Humanitarian Support - The war in Ukraine has displaced millions of people, both internally (5 million internally) and externally (8 million across Europe). This has created instability and economic disruption. The United States has launched an initiative to help stabilize internally displaced persons (IDPs) and host communities. The initiative focuses on providing educational, economic, and social services to IDPs and other vulnerable Ukrainians. Low-cost, locally based programs can help address complicated humanitarian problems and on-the-ground community frictions. This can have a positive impact on social and economic recovery and integration.
Finally, the war in Ukraine has created a number of economic and humanitarian challenges. The United States and its allies have invested heavily in supporting Ukraine's military, but it is also important to invest in non-military assistance, such as support for the government, police, education, hospitals, and electricity. This will help to improve the lives of Ukrainian citizens, sustain public support for the war effort, and build a foundation for a stable and prosperous Ukraine after the war. Non-military assistance is essential to the long-term success of Ukraine. (Johan Hassel, 2023)

**US and Trans-Atlantic Alliance to Counter Current Challenges of the War** - Collective action as well as support is crucial for the country considering in the long-term period. President Biden's leadership has been and will continue to be the critical factor in sustaining political unity - not only between the United States and Europe but also within Europe in forging continued support for Ukraine and go against aggression. The U.S. government’s support together with its allies is preferable to continue in order to build the gains made and invest in critical policies that further counter Russia, while collectively meet the challenging state in the region. Strengthening Europe's security capabilities and trans-Atlantic coordination toward a more secure, clean energy transition is important. The United States should support the EU’s efforts to increase its own security within NATO. Russia’s aggression must be met with a strong and resolute response, including increased NATO defense capabilities. This would help to address the global geopolitical landscape. The United States and Europe should cooperate actively in clean energy transitions. This cooperation could include working together to secure critical minerals, which are essential for clean energy technologies. The two sides should also work together to address policy, investment, commercial, and geostrategic challenges related to decarbonization. (Johan Hassel, 2023)

Finally, as the war continues the United States-led international support for Ukraine is crucial for its ability to continue defending itself. A defeat for Ukraine would mean further instability in Europe and around the world. If Russia’s aggression is allowed to prevail, it will embolden other challenging countries in the region to pursue their own aggressive interests. The United States, Europe, and Congress should support Ukraine in long-term period. (Johan Hassel, 2023)

**Russia-Ukraine War Its Consequence on the Current World Order**

The Russia-Ukraine war is having a profound impact on the future of the world’s political organization. The West's hope for an international system based on democracy, rule of law, and multilateral cooperation is now looking challenging or unrealistic. Current trends point to a further increasing geopolitical competition, economic protectionism and fragmentation, and a loosening of the structures of the international order. However, economic interdependence and transnational ties will likely remain strong enough to prevent a complete lapse into anarchy and unrestrained competition.
Up until around 2008, the mantra of Western discourse about international politics was a liberal and rules-based world order grounded in market economics, democracy, and multilateral diplomacy. The United States and the EU saw themselves as the main promoters of such an order, which they hoped would eventually include most of the world. Since then, faith in this vision has diminished dramatically. The drawing down of Washington’s international engagement has expanded the maneuvering space of stronger states in the Global South, which have become increasingly assertive players in international politics. They have forged new coalitions, enhanced their political and economic influence, and built up their military clout. This has sometimes resulted in regional struggles for hegemony, forcing weaker countries to do what they have always done: seek security either by allying with bigger powers or balancing between them. (Lehne, 2023)

As Lehne states, geopolitics is not the only challenge to an orderly world. International nongovernmental organizations have documented more than fifteen years of democratic decline. According to Freedom House, about 38% of the global population currently lives in “not free” countries and only 20% lives in “free” countries. Globalization is running out of steam, as reshoring and decoupling are the slogans of the day and protectionism rises in many parts of the world. The internet massively expands opportunities to disseminate propaganda, disinformation, and fake news. Information is increasingly weaponized in the service of geopolitics, undermining democratic processes and manipulating public opinion. Storms, fires, floods, droughts, and other manifestations of the climate crisis - which is worsening from year to year - disrupt the lives of millions and threaten stability in many regions. (Lehne, 2023)

In the face of these challenges, the multilateral system is under severe strain and risks losing legitimacy and effectiveness in tackling transnational challenges. The latest UN development report notes that cascading and intersecting crises and growing inequalities are putting the Sustainable Development Goals in jeopardy. In short, the Russian war against Ukraine is a major turning point in world history. It is likely to lead to a more fragmented and competitive international order, with less emphasis on democracy and multilateralism. The future of the world is uncertain, but it is clear that the challenges facing us are daunting. (Lehne, 2023)

Russia-Ukraine War: Positive and Negative Scenarios

According to A.H. Cordesman (2023), Ukrainian forces did well with outside support in 2022, and Russia suffered important losses both on the battlefield and from the economic sanctions imposed by Europe, the United States, and other powers. The challenges Ukraine now faces, as well as the challenges that the U.S. and its European partners face is creating a new security structure in Ukraine and in Europe. As Joseph Borrell Fontelles, the senior foreign policy official of the Europe-
an Union, said at the Munich security conference in February 2023 “There needs to be less applause and better supply with arms . . . much more has to be done, and much quicker.” Russia has suffered some tactical defeats and has lost a substantial amount of its armor—including up to half of its most modern tanks. It has suffered from economic sanctions, cuts in foreign investment, and limited access to export markets. (Cordesman, 2023)

Currently it’s not clear when and how the war between Russia and Ukraine will end that has become a proxy war involving the U.S. and its strategic partners. Ukraine has not sustained its counteroffensives against Russia and has not recovered most of the territory it lost in 2022. Now Ukraine faces a bitter war of against steadily growing Russian forces, facing ongoing missile and air attacks on Ukraine’s military and civilian infrastructure. It is obvious that Ukraine may need sustained military and civil aid for years to come. In addition, it will need massive aid in economic recovery once the fighting ends. Furthermore, NATO needs to make a massive effort to rebuild its forces to deter Russia from any further military actions. (Cordesman, 2023)

Finally, Russia’s success in war may result Russia’s nuclear build-up, its rejection of arms control, its ties to China, and its relations with states outside Europe and the rest of NATO. (Cordesman, 2023)

Conclusion

US geopolitical power is evident in the current multipolar world and its effort to strategically maintain peaceful and secure world is crucial. US tries to support democracy in all over the world and support countries challenged by offensive or aggressive policy. From its history the US role had been and is to promote secure and democratic world order. Given paper analyzed major aspects and role of US in supporting Ukraine while being in war against Russia.

Shifrinson (2022) argues that the United States is less threatened by aggression and the US as well as other Western allies still have limited interests in Ukraine to avoid direct involvement in the conflict and escalate the process, which could lead to a broader confrontation with Russia, including a potential nuclear crisis. Thus, current circumstances are challenging avoiding escalation of the conflict and protecting its own strategic interests considering China’s regional influence. At the same time, limiting the economic fallout of the war at a time when the consequences of the Covid pandemic continue to exist in the global economic outlook. Finally, the United States has at least some interest in maintaining the already-favorable European balance of power as an insurance policy against the risk that Russia or some other state concludes that aggression might pay. (Shifrinson, 2022)
The United States’ initial response, together with its Western Allies, to Russia’s invasion was warranted according to Cordesman. Diplomatic condemnation of Moscow’s invasion, strong sanctions on Russia, and an initial arms delivery to prevent an easy Russian success were all appropriate measures. However, as the war continues and the period lasts longer than imagined given measurements become uncertain, requiring more timely measurements to bringing the conflict to an end and avoiding escalation. Besides, maintaining good relations among the US, Western Allies or Russia is important too. It is too early to say that Ukraine will win the war against Russia. The current military aid and weapons provided to Ukraine have been too small and too slow, and the United States and its partners have not developed a coherent approach to deploying new systems and weapons. The United States and European states need to take a much harder look at how to support and sustain Ukraine’s forces and civil population over time. At the same time, much depends on the ability of the United States and its partners to find some approach to grand strategy that can negotiate an acceptable end to the fighting and create a stable outcome to the war. Cordesman argues that the United States and its allies need to develop a more coherent grand strategy for supporting Ukraine in its war against Russia. And the author also argues that the United States needs to find a way to negotiate an acceptable end to the fighting and create a stable outcome to the war. (Cordesman, 2023)

Besides, the war has caused widespread damage to Ukraine’s infrastructure, and it is unlikely that the country will be able to fully recover without significant international aid. Humanitarian and war crime trials are unlikely to have a significant impact on the course of the war. At best, they may help to bring some measure of justice to the victims of the conflict. However, it is more likely that they will simply be used by both sides to score political points.

As mentioned above, Cordesman argues that the war in Ukraine is likely to continue until both sides are so exhausted that one side makes enough military gains to “win,” or both sides accept an awkward and unstable ceasefire. A Russian victory would leave Russia so divided from Europe that it would face a major ongoing confrontation with the West. A Ukrainian victory that does not result in massive political upheavals and changes in Russian goals could still leave Ukraine half crippled and without regaining the territory it lost in 2014. (Cordesman, 2023)

In either case, the fighting might end, but the tensions that led to the Russian invasion would remain, and there would be no broader restoration of stability between Russia, Europe, and the United States. If the fighting in Ukraine drags on, it is important to make peace negotiations a major priority.
Appendix

Appendix 1. Sanctions - The U.S., Europe, and other nations imposed broad and severe sanctions on Russia

Source: (Shifrinson, 2022)

Appendix 2. The Balance of Power Between Russia and NATO-Europe

Note: The 28 NATO members in Europe possess the material wherewithal to balance Russia’s military power. Source: (Shifrinson, 2022)

Appendix 3. US Military Aid to Ukraine Since the Invasion

Note: The total for Ukraine since the invasion might include categories not included in 2020 data. Source: Council on Foreign Relations (Jonathan Masters, 2023)
Appendix 4. US Aid to Ukraine Exceeding that From Other Countries

Note: Bilateral aid from the EU institutions and the top 20 donor countries as of January 15, 2023; the data source includes EU member states, members of the Group of Seven (G7), Australia, China, India, New Zealand, Norway, South Korea, Switzerland, Taiwan, and Turkey. Source: Council on Foreign Relations (Jonathan Masters, 2023)

Appendix 5. Total Government Aid to Ukraine

Note: top 15 countries, total aid - bilateral government support, European Union and European Investment Bank Commitments (country share). Source: (Shifrinson, 2022)
References


